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Note
AGAINST INDIVIDUALLY SIGNED
JUDICIAL OPINIONS
JAMES MARKHAM
INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court Justices have been known to guard their personal
privacy and the mystique of the Court. In response to a congressional
proposal to videotape the Court’s oral arguments, Justice Souter
remarked, “I can tell you the day you see a camera coming into our
courtroom, it is going to be rolled over my dead body.”1 There was
likewise anger from some members of the Court when Bob
2
Woodward and Scott Armstrong published The Brethren in 1979
using information obtained from former clerks, and again in 2004
3
when David Margolick penned a Vanity Fair exposé (based on
similar leaks) on how the Court came to its decision in Bush v. Gore.4
The reasons typically given for this cloak of secrecy are sensible
enough: to protect the uncensored and free flow of information
between the Justices; to protect the independence of the Justices by
shielding them from public opinion and politicization; and, as one
commentator more humorously postulated, to preserve their

Copyright © 2006 by James Markham.
1. On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, ‘Over My Dead Body’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 1996, at 1.24.
2. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979).
3. David Margolick et al., The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 310.
4. See Edward Lazarus, The Supreme Court’s Excessive Secrecy: Why It Isn’t Merited,
FINDLAW.COM, Sept. 30, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20040930.html (last visited
Aug. 24, 2006) (“Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, former Deputy Attorney
General William Barr, former Solicitor General Theodore Olson, and close to 90 former law
clerks . . . have written a letter excoriating the clerks who spoke to Margolick as traitors to the
Court and to their profession.”).
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anonymity so they can “amble through antique shops unnoticed on
5
summer mornings when the Court is in recess.”
Despite their efforts, however, the Justices often find themselves
in the spotlight. There is no shortage of attention paid to the Justices’
personal lives; a multiplicity of web logs (blogs) is devoted to
6
7
everything from judges’ jurisprudence to their appearance and
personalities. The Court has certainly come a long way from its status
during the early years of the Republic, when it was considered a
posting of such obscurity that presidents had difficulty finding men
willing to accept the nomination.8 Today, by contrast, Supreme Court
Justices and certain other federal judges have attained celebrity
9
status. Critics have accused judges of occupying center stage in the
red state–blue state culture war and of promoting a cult of personality
inappropriate for a neutral and unbiased arbiter.10 Indeed, the Justices
11
levy similar accusations against one another —and when they do, the
fuzzy contours of a problem begin to take shape.
5. Dahlia Lithwick, Justice Showtime, AM. LAW., Dec. 2005, at 130, 130.
6. See, e.g., Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/
supreme_court (last visited Aug. 17, 2006); SCOTUSblog.com, http://www.scotusblog.com (last
visited Aug. 17, 2006).
7. See, e.g., Underneath Their Robes, http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com. This blog
achieved notoriety with its rankings of the best-looking members of the federal judiciary.
Bodacious Babes of the Bench: The Female Superhotties of the Federal Judiciary!,
http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com/main/2004/07/index (July 20, 2004) (last visited Aug. 17,
2006); Big Swinging Gavels: The Male Superhotties of the Federal Judiciary!,
http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com/main/2004/07/index (July 21, 2004) (last visited Aug. 17,
2006). The pseudonymous author of the blog, “Article III Groupie,” revealed his identity as
Michael Lat, an Assistant United States Attorney in Newark, New Jersey. Jeffrey Toobin, The
Bench, NEW YORKER, Nov. 21, 2005, at 44, 44. Appropriately enough (in this Note arguing for
anonymity for Supreme Court Justices), Mr. Lat chose to cease blogging anonymously because
he “felt frustrated that [he] was putting a lot of time into this and was unable to get any credit
for it.” Id.; see also Adam Liptak, Mystery of Gossipy Blog on the Judiciary Is Solved, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A14.
8. Scott Douglas Gerber, Introduction to SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN
MARSHALL 2, 2–3 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998). The first Chief Justice, John Jay, is said to
have been so frustrated with the Court’s lack of influence and activity that he resigned his post
to assume the governorship of New York, and several potential successors turned down the
nomination altogether. Id.
9. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, It’s the Law, Not the Judge; but These Days the Bench Is the Hot
Seat, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2005, at B1 (“Judges today are being catapulted into public view as
personalities who seem fair game for attack rather than as anonymous oracles of the law.”).
10. Id. (“Liberals routinely denounce such Supreme Court justices as Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas as partisan conspirators . . . .”).
11. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Court
has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from
which the Members of this institution are selected . . . .”).
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Although the names of the Supreme Court Justices are perhaps
12
not household names, they are certainly known well by anyone in
the legal field. Consideration of an opinion’s author is a common
starting point for the scholar or practitioner who sets out to analyze a
decision, and legal journals are replete with retrospectives of various
Justices’ jurisprudential legacies.13 It is neither surprising nor unusual
that patterns emerge in the Justices’ votes. It is problematic, however,
when opinions are written less for the litigants than for an external
audience of like-minded devotees. Justice Ginsburg has called it
14
playing to the “home crowd.” Judge Posner calls it “play[ing] to the
gallery.”15 The notion that the Justices are beholden to ideological
constituencies outside the Court is the problem this Note seeks to
address.
Why do American appellate judges have such public personae at
16
all? High court judges in many other democracies do not. As a
possible answer, this Note considers one of the key procedural
differences between the American high court and its international
counterparts: the use of individually signed opinions. In the United
States, with the relatively rare exception of per curiam opinions and a
handful of other procedural oddities,17 each high court decision is
issued under the name of the Justice who wrote it. The individually
signed opinion has become such a cornerstone of American appellate
judicial practice—some consider it a virtual sine qua non for judicial
12. A 2003 survey showed that 65 percent of Americans could not name even one current
Supreme Court Justice; the most-named Justice in the survey was Justice O’Connor, who was
named by 25 percent of those surveyed. Results of FindLaw’s U.S. Supreme Court Awareness
Survey, http://www.findlaw.com/survey/SCsurveyresults.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2006).
13. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987); Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Brennan
and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 307 (1988); see also Charles Lane, In the
Center, Hers Was the Vote That Counted, WASH. POST, July 2, 2005, at A1.
14. See Bill Hord, Ginsburg Sees Threats to Court, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 8, 2006,
at 8B (“‘In some political circles,’ Ginsburg said, ‘it is fashionable to criticize and even threaten
federal judges who decide cases without regard to what the home crowd wants.’”).
15. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Forward: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 81 (2005) (“[J]udges . . . play to the gallery, as our Justices do.”).
16. See infra Part III. Justice Ginsburg relays a story told by Justice Scalia about an
exchange between one of his daughters and her host family abroad: “When the Scalia child
reported . . . that her father had become a federal judge . . . the change in occupation bewildered
the foreign family. Why would a tenured professor want to join the ranks of the judiciary?”
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 136 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (a joint opinion
authored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter); see also infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
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18
accountability, transparency, and independence —that one rarely
stops to consider its origin, much less its costs and benefits in the
administration of justice. As in other areas of American law,
19
“[f]amiliarity breeds inattention.”
Nothing in the Constitution or any other source of American law
mandates the current practice of identifying the author of each
opinion published in a given case, including majority opinions,
concurrences, and dissents. The system could have evolved in other
ways, and even today the Court occasionally departs from its standard
operating procedure in somewhat haphazard fashion. Having a
Justice’s name attached to an opinion brings a measure of
accountability and control to an otherwise secretive institution, but
this accountability carries with it a cost in the Court’s ability to appear
independent and above the political fray, and detracts from the
notion of the Court as something greater than the nine individuals
who comprise it. This Note considers whether the current practice is
the best practice, or whether the individually signed opinion
contributes to the “cult of the judge superseding the cult of the
robe.”20
Part I traces the origin and evolution of the practice of delivering
opinions under the name of a particular Justice from the pre–John
Marshall era of seriatim opinion delivery to the modern era of
21
numerous separately authored concurrences and dissents. Part II
considers what can be learned from those instances in which the
Court departs from its standard operating procedure and issues its
decision by per curiam opinion or other procedural anomaly. Of
particular interest is the Court’s tendency to use the per curiam not

18. MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS 3–4 (2004).
19. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18
(1980) (observing that “substantive due process” is often overlooked as a contradiction in
terms).
20. JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT 64 (1987). As Professor Brigham points
out, the phrase “cult of the robe” was used as early as 1828 to describe the aura of institutional
wisdom—a notion of tradition, legal education, and independence—surrounding the Justices.
Id. at 63.
21. This Note does not consider the increased frequency with which the Justices choose to
write separately, a trend discussed in detail elsewhere. See, e.g., John P. Kelsh, The Opinion
Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790–1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137 (1999);
Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by the Rehnquist
Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 777 (1989); Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme
Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186 (1959) (reviewing the history
of separate opinions).
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only for the very easy cases, but also for some of its most difficult and
22
politically charged cases, such as Bush v. Gore.
Part III turns briefly to the realm of the comparative,
highlighting foreign courts that do not use individually signed
opinions but nevertheless maintain accountability and control of their
judiciaries without a written record of each judge’s work. Finally, Part
IV considers the substantive effects of delivering opinions under an
individual judge’s signature: whether the benefit of accountability is
outweighed by a cost in potential “playing to the gallery”; whether, as
some have hypothesized, pride of authorship is an incentive necessary
23
for judges to do their work conscientiously; and whether the
personal nature of the individually signed opinion comes at the
24
expense of the Court’s institutional legitimacy. Would justice be
more equal for all litigants if the judge assigned to author and deliver
the outcome of the controversy remained anonymous? Would the
Court’s institutional strength be better protected if the Justices’ votes
were not revealed by name? Or would preserving the anonymity of
an opinion’s author simply darken the veil of secrecy around the
Court—a veil that is already the subject of considerable criticism?25
This Note seeks to address these questions, and concludes that the
benefits of anonymous opinions would outweigh the costs.
I. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE INDIVIDUALLY
SIGNED OPINION
The individually signed opinion has been the mainstay of the
Court’s opinion delivery process for so long that it is difficult to
imagine any alternative. It is second nature to analyze an opinion
based on who wrote it, and most first-year law students can probably
make an educated guess about the identity of an opinion’s author
based on style alone. Commentators use phrases like “vintage

22. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
23. LASSER, supra note 18, at 312.
24. See generally Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms
in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361 (1988) (explaining the factors that lead to the
increased use of individual opinions).
25. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95
GEO. L.J. 49, 97 n.161 (2006) (“Justices are public officials exercising governmental power, and I
believe that in a democracy, there should be transparency about all branches of government.”);
see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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27

Scalia” or “classic O’Connor” to describe an opinion. Attaching an
individual judge’s name to an opinion was a practice inherited, at
least in part, from England at the founding, but a look at the Court’s
early days shows that its opinion delivery practice has evolved
considerably over time, due as much to the personalities and
preferences of the early Justices as to America’s common law
heritage.
A. History
Opinion delivery during the Court’s first decade (1790–1801) can
best be described as unsettled, as the Court issued its early decisions
in at least four different ways during this period.28 First, in a practice
similar to that used by the House of Lords at the time of the
American Revolution, the Court would issue decisions seriatim. Each
Justice would write his own independent judgment, with all of the
opinions published in order from most junior to most senior Justice.29
A summary order stating the Court’s overall disposition of the case
30
would sometimes follow the seriatim opinions. Second, opinions
would sometimes be filed simply under the heading “By the Court,”
although this method was generally reserved for uncomplicated cases
in which the Court was unanimous or little legal reasoning was
required.31 Third, in a practice that would become the norm when
John Marshall took the Court’s helm, the Chief Justice would
occasionally deliver an opinion under his name, but with an indication
that he was speaking “for the Court.”32 And finally, there were initial
forays into the practice of the Justices writing separately from the
33
majority opinion of the Court, though the first true dissent was not
issued until 1806 by Justice Paterson in Simms & Wise v. Slacum.34
26. See, e.g., Bob Woodward & Charles Lane, Scalia Takes a Leading Role in Case, WASH.
POST, Dec. 11, 2000, at A1 (“The justice’s performance has been ‘vintage Scalia’ . . . . He does
not mince words.”).
27. See, e.g., Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2005_11_27_balkin_archive.html (Nov. 30, 2005) (last visited Aug. 17, 2006) (“So [everyone]
wins and everybody loses—a classic O’Connor result.”).
28. Kelsh, supra note 21, at 139.
29. ZoBell, supra note 21, at 192.
30. Id.; see, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 480 (1793) (concluding with an
order “By the Court”).
31. Kelsh, supra note 21, at 140; ZoBell, supra note 21, at 192.
32. Kelsh, supra note 21, at 142. Chief Justice Marshall’s delivery of the opinion did not
necessarily mean that he authored it. Id. at 142 n.30.
33. See, e.g., Sims v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 457 (1799) (Iredell, J.) (“Though I concur
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When John Marshall became Chief Justice, he sought to enhance
the Court’s institutional authority by presenting one opinion “for the
35
Court,” which he often (but not always) authored himself. Marshall
was adamant, in the name of the Court’s power and dignity, that his
be the only opinion issued, even when the Justices were not
unanimous in their decision of the case.36 Marshall brought the
practice of seriatim opinion writing to an abrupt end: of the sixtyseven non–per curiam opinions issued by the Court between 1801 and
1806, Marshall’s name alone was attached to sixty; the remaining
decisions were delivered by another Justice or in the seriatim style,
but only due to Marshall’s absence or recusal from the matter.37
An obvious consequence of Chief Justice Marshall’s desire to
speak with a single voice was the fact that differences among the
38
Justices became hidden from public view. In this regard, the
Marshall Court opinion delivery practice was akin to that used by the
English Privy Council, which was the highest appeals court available
for controversies arising in the Colonies.39 Professor ZoBell describes
the Privy Council practice as follows:
The Privy Council, in the exercise of this appellate jurisdiction,
adopted as its decision that favored by the majority of those present.
Once the decision of the Council had been determined, however, it

with the other Judges of the Court in affirming the Judgment of the Circuit Court, yet as I differ
from them in the reasons for affirmance, I think it proper to state my opinion particularly.”).
34. Simms & Wise v. Slacum, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 300, 309 (1806) (Paterson, J.). There is
some disagreement as to whether this is truly the first dissent. Justice William Johnson issued a
separate opinion in the case of Huidekoper’s Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1 (1805), in
which he “uttered a substantial dissent from the reasoning of the court,” but his statements were
made in what was actually a concurring opinion. Id. at 72 (Johnson, J.); ZoBell, supra note 21, at
195. In any event, Justice Johnson is widely considered the Court’s first dissenter. See generally
DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE FIRST DISSENTER (1954).
35. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 187.
36. ZoBell, supra note 21, at 193. Professor ZoBell notes examples of decisions that
Marshall’s single opinion portrayed as unanimous, but which were not. In Little v. Barreme, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), Marshall is alleged to have written the opinion and delivered it as if
unanimous even when it was “contrary to his own Judgment and Vote.” ZoBell, supra note 21,
at 193 n.41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Donald G. Morgan, Mr. Justice Johnson
and the Constitution, 57 HARV. L. REV. 328, 333 (1944) (quoting Justice Johnson)).
37. Kelsh, supra note 21, at 144.
38. Gerber, supra note 8, at 20.
39. ZoBell, supra note 21, at 187 (explaining the process for appealing to the Privy
Council).
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was announced as the decision of the whole, regardless of what may
40
have been the individual views of its members.

President Jefferson, a proponent of seriatim opinion delivery, was
opposed to Marshall’s masking of the Court’s internal workings in
41
“secret, unanimous opinions” because he believed that individual
reputation was the only mechanism short of impeachment for
42
maintaining a life-tenured judge’s accountability to the public. He
wrote that when “nobody knows what opinion any individual member
gave in any case, nor even that he who delivers the opinion,
concurred in it himself,” then personal reputation is “shielded
completely.”43 In further criticism, obviously directed at Marshall,
Jefferson wrote that opinions other than those delivered seriatim
were subject to being “huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority
of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of
lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the
law to his own mind, by the turn of his own reasoning.”44 President
Madison also called for a return to seriatim opinion delivery “so that
Republican judges could record their position on the issues.”45
Neither president got his wish in terms of a return to seriatim opinion
46
delivery, but their comments are nevertheless relevant to the
discussion that follows regarding use of the per curiam opinion47 and
48
the decisionmaking methodologies of other nations’ high courts.
Beginning in 1804, Chief Justice Marshall’s preference for
49
unanimity, publicly acknowledged in an 1819 newspaper article,
gradually gave way to the modern practice of one Justice writing for
the Court majority with other Justices free to write separate

40. Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
41. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 187; see also ZoBell, supra note 21, at 194 (“Jefferson
favored a return to ‘the sound practice of the primitive court’ of delivering seriatim opinions.”
(quoting Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822))).
42. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in
MORGAN, supra note 34, at 169.
43. Id.
44. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in
MORGAN, supra note 34, at 172.
45. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 187.
46. Some have argued that the modern-day proliferation of concurrences and dissents
effectively represents a return to seriatim opinion delivery. E.g., id. at 23.
47. See infra Part II.
48. See infra Part III.
49. 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 320 (1919).
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concurrences or dissents. Although the frequency with which the
Justices wrote separately fluctuated in the early nineteenth century,
by 1832, all members of the Court, including Marshall, had written
50
separately at least once. By the time of Marshall’s death in 1835, the
current practice “had become firmly entrenched.”51
What has changed in the last half century, however, is the
Justices’ tendency to write separately for seemingly personal (as
opposed to purely jurisprudential) reasons. Separate opinions in the
Court’s early years were characterized by a reluctant, apologetic
52
rhetoric—even, occasionally, from Chief Justice Marshall himself.
Modern separate opinions, however, have become so prevalent as to
lead one critic to write that a Justice may choose to “write separately
because this is a damned interesting case and the majority opinion
was assigned to someone else.”53 Some have argued that Justice
Frankfurter, “reluctant to surrender the intellectual independence he
had enjoyed as a law professor at Harvard,” opened the Pandora’s
Box of writing separately merely to express a personal observation;
he often wrote concurrences even when in complete agreement with
the majority.54 The major spike in the Court’s nonunanimity rate,
however, did not take place until the mid-1940s, after Harlan Fiske
55
Stone became Chief Justice.
B. Modern Practice
Today, separate opinions are frequently emotionally charged and
uniquely revealing of the Justices’ personal feelings on the matter at
issue. For instance, in the 1989 flag burning case, Texas v. Johnson,56

50. Kelsh, supra note 21, at 150.
51. Id. at 152.
52. See, e.g., Bank of U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 90 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting) (“I should now, as is my custom, when I have the misfortune to differ from this
Court, acquiesce silently in its opinion . . . .”).
53. David O. Stewart, A Chorus of Voices, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1991, at 50, 50.
54. Igor Kirman, Standing Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court
Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2100 n.104 (1995). Ironically, Justice
Frankfurter was also a strong proponent of judicial restraint, the view that judges should be
hesitant to declare legislative enactments invalid, and once suggested that dissents only
confused matters and made it difficult for lower courts and the American public “to make out
where the Supreme Court really stands as an institution.” BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 193–94
(quoting ALAN WESTIN, THE SUPREME COURT: VIEWS FROM THE INSIDE 26 (1961)).
55. Kelsh, supra note 21, at 174–75. Roughly 75 percent of the Court’s cases have been
nonunanimous since that time. Id.
56. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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Justice Kennedy voted with the majority but still chose to write
separately “not to qualify the words Justice Brennan cho[se] so
well . . . . but with a keen sense that this case, like others before us
57
from time to time, exacts its personal toll.” More recently, in
58
Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia tempered his dissent with a
personal disclaimer: “Let me be clear that I have nothing against
homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda through
normal democratic means.”59
The shift from the institutional to personal nature of opinion
writing was also evidenced in Justice Breyer’s subtle and inadvertent
60
rhetorical slip in South Central Bell v. Alabama, when he used the
61
pronoun “I” instead of “we” in a majority opinion. The fact that the
62
pronoun was quickly noticed by Court observers —coupled with the
fact that Justice Breyer apologized for the mistake63—suggests that
majority opinions are more closely guarded institutional territory
than concurrences or dissents.
Scholars (and the Justices) have different views on the merits of
64
modern opinion delivery practices. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
Great Dissenter, was known to have considered dissents
65
“undesirable” due to their cost in institutional legitimacy, and
Justice Brandeis was known to have a cache of completed separate
opinions (“replete with the most exquisite detail of citation”)66
withheld from publication so as not to inhibit the Court’s
67
decisiveness. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, has written that
dissents augment the Court’s stature by forcing “the majority to

57. Id. at 420 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
59. Id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. South Cent. Bell v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999).
61. Id. at 167 (the “I” has since been corrected to “we” in the U.S. Reports). The
reverberations from this incident are detailed in Tony Mauro, Breyer’s “I” Scream, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 26, 1999, at 1. Vanderbilt Professor Barry Friedman said the incident was “like the
Wizard of Oz stepping out from behind the curtain.” Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See infra Part IV.
65. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66. John P. Frank, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC.
401, 401 (1958) (reviewing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957)).
67. Id. at 403–04.
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68
refine its opinion” and making the Court “not just the central organ
of legal judgment . . . [but] center stage for significant legal debate.”69
At a minimum, it can be said that the Court’s practice of using
individually signed opinions for the majority opinion and any
concurrences and dissents is now well-established, something that
could not be said during its first two decades. A look, however, at
some of the ways in which the Court periodically departs from its
standard practice illustrates certain limitations of the individually
signed opinion.

II. USE OF THE PER CURIAM OPINION AND OTHER
PROCEDURAL ANOMALIES
Per curiam opinions—those issued “by the court” with no
individual Justice’s name attached70—have been alternatively praised
and criticized by Court observers and by the Justices themselves.
They have been at once lauded as an invaluable means of rapidly and
apolitically dispensing with certain matters71 and derided as “the
72
handmaiden of law clerks.” Some have cited a high rate of per
curiam opinions as a symptom of an overworked or overburdened
court, arguing that the unnamed opinion is a shortcut through which a
court can dispense with cases without giving them its full attention.73
It makes sense for certain straightforward opinions to be disposed of
in per curiam fashion, but if the “great legitimacy” of common law
judicial decisionmaking rests so heavily on its “great transparency,”74
then use of the per curiam in the very difficult or most politically
charged cases becomes a curiosity. After defining the term, this Part
argues that the Supreme Court’s successful use of per curiam opinions
68. Justice Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, Address Before the Supreme Court
Historical Society (June 13, 1994), in 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 41.
69. Id. at 39.
70. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (8th ed. 2004).
71. Henry S. Manley, Nonpareil Among Judges, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 50, 51 (1948).
72. Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Maligned Per Curiam: A Fresh Look at an Old
Colleague, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 41, 50 (1994–95).
73. See, e.g., Peter L. Murray, Maine’s Overburdened Law Court: Has the Time Come for a
Maine Appeals Court?, 52 ME. L. REV. 43, 73 n.210, 74 (2000) (attributing a decline in the
number of per curiams issued by the Nebraska and Utah supreme courts to the establishment of
courts of appeal that reduced the high court workload in those states); Note, Supreme Court Per
Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 HARV. L. REV. 707, 722 (1956) (suggesting that the per curiam
opinion may provide “the most feasible method of enabling the Court to handle its present
workload,” despite the numerous problems the practice presents).
74. LASSER, supra note 18, at 3.
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shows that opinion attribution is not essential to an opinion’s
legitimacy.
A. Defining Per Curiam
Before considering the Court’s use of the per curiam opinion, it
is useful to define precisely what a per curiam opinion is. In actuality,
the Court has used the per curiam designation for a wide variety of
purposes, and has not used it consistently over time. The Court’s first
published opinion to carry the per curiam heading was Mesa v. United
75
76
States, issued in 1862. The per curiam was initially used for cases in
which the issues of substantive law were so clear that no individual
77
Justice needed to take time to craft a detailed opinion. It developed
into a useful method for quickly disposing of cases (often without
briefing or oral argument) for lack of a substantial federal question;
for granting or denying certiorari petitions or dismissing certiorari as
having been improvidently granted; or, under the Burger Court in
particular, for handling cases in which the Court granted review,
vacated the lower court ruling, and remanded the case for
reconsideration (an oft-criticized practice known as a “GVR”).78 The
per curiam label has sometimes been used interchangeably with what
might better be described as memorandum opinions, such as those
offering stays of execution in death penalty cases. Decisions have also
been labeled per curiam when the Justice to whom the opinion was
initially assigned died or left the Court before publication.79
Although per curiam opinions have a somewhat higher rate of
unanimity than signed opinions, they are not always unanimous. In
fact, the sample of opinions in one study surprisingly showed them to

75. Mesa v. United States, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 721 (1862) (per curiam).
76. Id. Professor Ray points out that an earlier opinion, West v. Brashear, 131 U.S. app. at
lxvi (1839), was actually the first per curiam written by the Court, but that it was not published
until 1889 in an appendix to the United States Reports along with a number of other previously
omitted cases. Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme
Court’s Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517, 522 (2000).
77. See Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76
JUDICATURE 29, 30 (1992) (noting that the per curiam opinion was “[f]irst used only to indicate
cases with ‘indisputably clear’ substantive law”).
78. Id. at 32 & n.14. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, “Granted, Vacated, and
Remanded”—Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court Practice, 67 JUDICATURE 389
(1984) (discussing in detail the Burger Court’s GVR practice).
79. Id. at 30. For example, the court used a per curiam opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969), after Justice Fortas, the author of the opinion, resigned from the Court. Id.
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80
be unanimous less than half the time. Professor Wasby and
colleagues note that Justice Thurgood Marshall was a vocal critic of
the Court’s practice of attaching the per curiam label to summary
decisions lacking consensus among the Justices:

He argued that because per curiam means “by the Court,” it should
be limited to situations where the opinion can “speak for the entire
Court on a matter so clear that the Court can and should speak with
one voice”; to hand down a per curiam over the dissent of justices
81
who would set the case for plenary treatment is thus wrong.

Certain of the Justices made a habit of dissenting from per curiam
opinions; Justice William O. Douglas, for example, wrote seventy-one
dissents, twenty-one concurrences, and five other opinions separate
82
from per curiams during his time on the Court. In Bazemore v.
Friday,83 a 1986 per curiam opinion, all nine Justices joined in Justice
Brennan’s concurrence,84 four Justices joined Justice White’s,85 and
86
three joined Justice Brennan’s second separate opinion. This odd
array of opinions illustrates “a subtle but unexplained distinction
between what the Court itself held and what all of its members
believed,”87 and there is little question that the per curiam has, at
times, been used to give opinions an undeserved aura of consensus.88
B. Anonymous, yet Legitimate
Despite this criticism and disagreement about the proper role of
the per curiam, it has served a valuable function at numerous times in
the Court’s history. Perhaps the most notable was the period after

80. Wasby et al., supra note 77, at 35 (citing data from a sample of cases decided between
1969 and 1981, which showed that 30 percent of signed opinions were unanimous, whereas 44
percent of per curiams were unanimous).
81. Id. at 38 (quoting Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 408–09 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
82. Ray, supra note 76, at 527 (“Together, [Justices] Black and Douglas led the Court
toward a model of decisionmaking that never hesitated to disturb consensus opinions with
statements of individual views.”).
83. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
85. Id. at 407 (White, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 409 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
87. Ray, supra note 76, at 529 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 546 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), as a case in which
the use of a per curiam heading gave the opinion a “sense of inevitability” that its five-to-four
decision did not merit).
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89
Brown v. Board of Education when the Court expanded
desegregation from public education to public beaches,90 golf
courses,91 bus systems,92 and park facilities93 through a series of short
per curiam opinions. Per curiams have also been a means for the
94
Court to act expeditiously in a time of war in Ex parte Quirin, to
answer a time-sensitive First Amendment issue in New York Times
95
Co. v. United States, to hold Georgia’s capital punishment regime
unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia,96 and most recently to resolve
(albeit controversially) a presidential election in Bush v. Gore.97
These decisions showcase the per curiam opinion’s flexibility and
seeming appeal in time-sensitive or politically-charged situations
and—although some would argue to the contrary, particularly in the
98
context of Quirin and Bush v. Gore —its general record of success.
Certainly in the post-Brown series of cases it was an effective strategy
for expanding desegregation doctrine beyond the realm of the
schools.
Given the high profile of these cases, one can argue that the
individually signed opinion is not strictly necessary to preserve the
Court’s legitimacy. The questionable legacy of the Bush v. Gore per
curiam opinion may, of course, temper this argument, but the Court
does not appear to have suffered quite the irreparable damage feared
99
by Justice Breyer in his Bush dissent.
The occasional appearance of alternative opinion delivery
mechanisms besides the per curiam also supports the notion that the

89. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
90. Mayor of Balt. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam), aff’g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.
1955).
91. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam), vacating and remanding
223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955).
92. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.
1956).
93. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per
curiam), aff’g 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958).
94. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (per curiam).
95. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
96. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
97. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
98. See Ray, supra note 76, at 576 (“The effort failed precisely because . . . students of the
Court were not likely to be lulled by the per curiam label into the belief that this opinion
represented an authentic consensus.”).
99. Bush, 531 U.S. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he appearance of a split decision runs
the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the Court itself.”).
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individually signed opinion is unsuited for some of the Court’s most
100
daunting work. In Cooper v. Aaron, for example, when the Court
faced the possibility of “massive resistance”101 by Southern states after
Brown, all nine Justices signed the opinion which ordered the Little
102
Rock, Arkansas, public schools to desegregate. This unique showing
of unanimity and institutional authority—going beyond the
unanimous but individually attributed opinion in Brown—served its
purpose, but it also raises several questions. Should an individually
authored opinion, even one announcing a unanimous decision, be
viewed as any less authoritative because it does not bear the actual
signature of all nine Justices? Is not an opinion signed by all nine
Justices the functional equivalent of a unanimous per curiam opinion
signed by none of them? The joint opinion issued by Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey103 underscores this point—the
Justices sought to strengthen the Court’s institutional legitimacy when
adjudicating one of the country’s most volatile controversies by
moving away from the individually authored opinion. If nothing else,
the three authors of the joint opinion may have avoided the intense
personal burden felt by Justice Blackmun as Roe v. Wade’s lone
author, which one observer described as a kind of “post-traumatic
stress disorder.”104
Although some have argued that “Judge Per Curiam . . . has
105
been drafted for too many hard cases,” the institutional and
strategic value of opinions not attributed to any particular author is
clear from the previous discussion. If the per curiam (or other non–
individually attributed) opinion works in difficult situations, why not
use it more often, or even exclusively? In some legal systems, per
curiam style opinion delivery is the rule rather than the exception,
and identification of the judge who authored an opinion is not just
irrelevant, it is anathema. The next Part considers how American
opinion delivery practice compares with that used in countries whose

100. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
101. NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 515 (E.D. Va. 1958), vacated sub nom. Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
102. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4.
103. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
104. William Saletan, Unbecoming Justice Blackmun, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2005, at 35, 37
(reviewing LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005)).
105. Manley, supra note 71, at 51–52.

04__MARKHAM.DOC

938

1/11/2007 10:46 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:923

high courts do not rely on the individually signed judicial opinion, and
what might be gained and lost by adopting a similar approach in the
United States.
III. THE ANONYMITY OF THE JUDICIARY IN CONTINENTAL
EUROPEAN SYSTEMS
Montesquieu wrote that “the national judges are no more, than
the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings
incapable of moderating either its force or rigor.”106 To Americans,
this conception of judges is, for lack of a better description, foreign.
The most important passage in perhaps the most celebrated Supreme
Court decision stands for very nearly the opposite: “It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule.”107 This fundamental difference in
the way judges in the two systems are viewed stems not only from the
differences inherent in the common and civil law systems, but also in
part from the manner in which the judges’ product is published—in
many European judicial systems, majority opinions are issued
anonymously. Such systems have been roundly criticized by
American scholars: “In the American legal imagination . . . Civilian
judicial decision-making has long stood for the very antithesis of
transparently reasoned, individually accountable . . . and thus
legitimate Common Law judicial decision-making.”108 Nevertheless,
this Part argues that the American system, like its Continental
analogues, depends on factors other than opinion attribution to
maintain judicial accountability.
Before considering the potential applicability of European
methodology to the American judiciary, it is helpful to set out a brief
background on how a Continental high court operates, with a focus
on its opinion delivery practices. Because the French high court for
civil matters, the Cour de Cassation, has “long been the symbol of
109
traditional Civilian judging,” it will serve as the best example,
although there are, to be sure, many differences among the civil law

106. CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 209
(David Wallace Carrithers ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748).
107. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
108. LASSER, supra note 18, at 5.
109. Id.
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110
countries of Continental Europe. In France and other civil law
countries, appellate opinions are published by “THE COURT,” with no
indication of the opinion’s author or the membership of the panel
111
that heard the case. Rather, the decision is offered in the third
person singular and issued in what U.S. observers would consider per
curiam form—by the entire court as a unit. There are no dissenting or
concurring opinions, and the total decision is usually about a page in
length, citing the facts, the relevant provision from the Code, and a
decision, unsupported by legal reasoning.112 The Recueil Dalloz,
roughly equivalent to the West reporters in the United States,
publishes only a handful—about five—of Cour de Cassation
conclusions each year, which means that the public is unaware not
113
only of who writes the opinions, but also of what the opinions say.
The obvious concern about such a system is judicial control and
accountability. The following passage summarizes the typical criticism
of the French system:

They offer monolithic, unsigned, collegial judgments that refuse to
disclose judicial votes, prohibit concurrences or dissents, and shun
the overt discussion of policy in favor of syllogistic—or at least
highly deductive—statements that downplay, if not mask or ignore,
114
all meaningful judicial interpretive work.

If not through transparency, how do the French police their judges
who, like American federal judges, are appointed for life?
According to Professor Lasser, the French ensure judicial
accountability and control through “[p]rofessional [n]ormative
[m]anagement.”115 By making the judiciary a lifelong profession,

110. Id. at 6.
111. See id. at 31 (providing an example of a typical French supreme court decision, one
roughly half a page in length).
112. See id. at 31–33 (discussing the content of a sample French supreme court decision).
113. Id. at 48. In addition to the formal decision issued by the Court, there are parallel
documents known as rapports (issued by “the reporting judge”). Id. These rapports generally
recount the facts and procedural history of the case, legal analysis, and offer a recommendation
for the court, such as “I therefore conclude in favor of quashing.” Id. at 50. The name of the
rapporteur in a given case is listed in small print at the end of the decision. Id. at 48 n.60.
Rapports would be more recognizable to Americans as judicial opinions than the Cour’s formal
decisions, were they not generally secret and unpublished. See id. at 48–49 (noting that rapports
are “rarely published” and “protected by the secrecy of judicial deliberations, and therefore
sheltered by law as a part of the judicial system’s internal workings”).
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. at 307.
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carefully choosing its membership at an early age, and managing
every facet of judges’ education and training along the way, the
116
French create a “particularly coherent corps of judicial magistrates”
who, in effect, police themselves:
The French judicial system, in short, prepares the normative judicial
ground extremely carefully, and then reinforces this preparation
through an elaborate and effective system of professional carrots
and sticks. The French mode of control of individual judges is
therefore profoundly and rigorously institutional: mastery of the
judicial institution’s normative and professional values is the sine
117
qua non for advancement through the ranks.

Although there is no doubt a degree of collegiality among
American judges, there is nowhere near the formalized institutional
structure and uniform career path found in most of Continental
Europe. American judges typically come to the bench after a career
in academia, private practice, or government service and, the
argument goes, therefore lack the common educational background
118
shared by many of their European counterparts. Because the
American judicial career path is less formalized and generally
unpredictable,119 judicial accountability and control become a
personal matter: judges must support their opinions with good judicial
reasons, issued under their individual signatures as a sort of pledge
that they “ha[ve] thoroughly participated in th[e] process and
120
assume[] individual responsiblity [sic] for the decision.” Absent the
121
“professional carrots and sticks” present in the French system, the
incentive for American judges to craft an opinion well is, Professor
Lasser argues, grounded in a notion of pride of authorship in “all
written work that goes out in [the judge’s] name.”122 Lasser concludes
that this form of accountability, with the individually signed opinion
123
as its “cornerstone,” places tremendous pressure on American

116. Id. at 308.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 311.
119. One judge wrote that the reasons some judges are elevated from trial to appellate
courts are “factors known but to politics and God.” Nygaard, supra note 72, at 46.
120. Owen Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1443 (1983).
121. LASSER, supra note 18, at 311.
122. Id. at 312 (quoting Harry T. Edwards, A Judge’s View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and
Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 259, 266 (1981)).
123. Id. at 313.

04__MARKHAM.DOC

2006]

1/11/2007 10:46 AM

JUDICIAL OPINIONS

941

judges to justify and rejustify the reasoning behind their decisions, to
124
the extent that opinions become inordinately long and convoluted.
Moreover, he argues, the remarkable transparency of the American
system forces judges to resort to a pragmatic and safe reasoning that
produces a “stunningly powerful and monolithic centrism.”125
Comparing common law and civil law judges is, of course, largely
126
a matter of apples and oranges. But despite oversimplifying the role
of the Continental European judge,127 this Part is included in the Note
for two reasons, both of which serve to counter the normative power
of the actual. First, it demonstrates that high courts in other
democracies can and do operate without individually signed opinions.
Second, it illustrates a mechanism of judicial accountability and
control (“professional normative management”128) that does not rely
on the individual signature and that, arguably, is already an important
aspect of accountability and control in the United States.
Consider the Court’s current Justices, along with the most recent
nominees to fill its vacancies. Although there is no national judicial
school in the United States as there is in France and most other
European countries, of the current Justices, only Justice Stevens (a
graduate of Northwestern) went to a law school other than Harvard,
129
Three members of the Rehnquist Court,
Yale, or Stanford.
including Justice Stevens, clerked for Supreme Court Justices, and
Chief Justice Roberts clerked for then–Associate Justice Rehnquist
during the 1980 Term.130 Thus, despite the lack of a singular state
training institution, those who reach the pinnacle of the American

124. See id. at 321 (“Is it really so clear that such long, convoluted, and fractured judicial
decisions reveal more or offer better guidance than do short, concise, impersonal, and collegial
ones . . . ?”).
125. Id. at 344.
126. See John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1865 (1988) (“The major difficulty in approaching such questions is the
basic one of comparability. On one level, the United States, France and Germany are much
alike . . . . [B]ut . . . French and German judges differ from American judges in their training,
selection, tenure, advancement, discipline, and removal.”).
127. For a more detailed review of the opinion delivery practices of certain European
courts, see Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 145–47.
128. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
129. Federal Judges Biographical Database, http://air.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last
visited Aug. 18, 2006). Justice Ginsburg attended Harvard Law School for two years but
ultimately graduated from Columbia. Id.
130. Biographies of Current Members of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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judiciary certainly share a common background in terms of legal
education. A cynical look at the failed nomination of Harriet Miers (a
131
graduate Southern Methodist University Law School) —especially
when compared to the successful nomination of Samuel Alito (Yale
Law School)—suggests that a nominee from outside a select group of
institutions will be deemed unsuitable for the job.132 Politics play a
more prominent role in American judicial selection than in countries
like France, where judges rise through a hierarchy based on test
scores and evaluations,133 but it is hard to argue that Supreme Court
Justices are “untrained, politically selected, and largely
134
uncontrolled” as compared to their European counterparts, and
therefore need the added accountability measure of signing their
opinions.
IV. RECONSIDERING THE INDIVIDUALLY SIGNED OPINION
In a 1947 free speech case, Justice Jackson wrote: “I do not know
whether it is the view of the Court that a judge must be thickskinned
or just thickheaded, but nothing in my experience or observation
confirms the idea that he is insensitive to publicity. Who does not
prefer good to ill report of his work?”135 Six decades later, Judge
Posner added: “Justices no more than other Americans can be
136
expected to be content to be wallflowers.” To be sure, the Justices
cannot be expected to operate in a vacuum. But there comes a point
at which the Justices’ individual personae eclipse their collective
institutional role, and at which justice seems less equal when an
opinion is read differently depending on who wrote it.

131. Harriet Miers, Counsel to the President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/
hmiers-bio.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006)
132. See, e.g., Ann Coulter, Does this Law Degree Make My Resume Look Fat? (Oct. 12,
2005), http://www.anncoulter.org/cgi-local/article.cgi?article=80 (last visited Aug. 16, 2006)
(arguing that Harriet Miers was not the most qualified person President Bush could have
nominated to the Supreme Court).
133. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from
Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1676 (2004) (“[T]hey qualify for the bench by passing a merit
examination and advance from one court to the next in the same way, or simply by seniority (as
in Italy).”).
134. LASSER, supra note 18, at 346.
135. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 396 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
136. Posner, supra note 15, at 76 (suggesting the Court should be “nonpartisian” but not
necessarily “nonpolitical”).
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One author argued that the tipping point was reached twenty
years ago when he wrote that “a cult of the judge [now] supersed[es]
137
the cult of the robe.” He cited anecdotal evidence such as Justice
O’Connor’s appearing on the cover of People magazine in a pink
dress, or the fact that the Justices frequently make public appearances
in “civilian” clothes instead of their robes, including on the cover of
138
The Brethren. He could not have foreseen today’s proliferation of
information about the Court on the Internet, including numerous
influential blogs139 and online magazines like Slate.140 Sometimes these
sites are simply “fan pages,” recounting memorable passages from
141
opinions written by a particular Justice. Sometimes, however, they
are something more than mere adulation. SCOTUSblog.com
regularly includes “State of the Term” reports that summarize the
number of opinions authored by each Justice in a given month and
then predict case outcomes based on a presumption that opinionwriting workloads will be roughly equal among the Justices. For
example, in a May 2005 posting, a contributor to the blog recapped an
upcoming case and speculated that “[n]either Justice Stevens nor
Justice Souter has issued a majority opinion for the sitting, so they
presumably are the authors.”142 Discussing the same case the
following month, the contributor wrote, “Justice Souter [is] likely
writing the opinion, which presumably would be good news for
Miller-El.”143
Predicting a case’s outcome based on who might be authoring the
opinion is symptomatic of a Court whose members are too easily
placed in neat ideological categories. More troubling, however, is

137. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 64.
138. Id. at 63–64 (noting that judges are the “only nonmilitary government officials with
distinctive dress,” but that the “iconography has been shifting from the cult of the robe. Once
unknown and short on authority without their robes, the justices have been stepping out . . .”).
139. See, e.g., SCOTUSblog.com, http://www.scotusblog.com (last visited Dec. 12, 2006);
Underneath Their Robes, http://www.underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com (last visited Dec. 12,
2006); Ninomania, http://ninomania.blogspot.com (last visited Dec. 12, 2006).
140. SLATE, http://slate.com (last visited Dec. 12, 2006).
141. See, e.g., Cult of Scalia, http://members.aol.com/schwenkler/scalia.
142. Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog.com, http://www.scotusblog.com/
movabletype/archives/2005/05/state_of_the_te_2.html (May 24, 2005) (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
143. Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog.com, http://www.scotusblog.com/
movabletype/archives/2005/06/state_of_the_te_3.html (June 7, 2005) (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
As it turns out, Justice Souter did write the majority opinion in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231
(2005), and that was indeed good news for Miller-El, id. at 235 (“Today we find Miller-El
entitled to prevail . . . .”).
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when the Justices speak this way about each other, acknowledging
one another’s role as members (if not leaders) of political, cultural,
and ideological interest groups in American society. In Blakely v.
144
Washington, for example, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
included a footnote which jabbed at “Justice Breyer’s academic
supporters,”145 as if Justice Breyer were the head of a particular school
of legal thought regarding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Some
have argued that the Justices have gone too far in their tendency to
use their written opinions to “engage in public conflict.”146 Professors
Ferejohn and Pasquino ask: “Does Justice Scalia . . . really think, or
even hope, the publication of a strident dissent will move one of his
fellow Justices to change his or her mind? Or is his target audience
147
elsewhere?” They conclude that the Justices are effectively using
their opinions to speak over the heads of the litigants to a public
constituency of sorts,148 and that this strains the notion of the Court as
149
an independent body.
A. The Proposal
All of this raises the question, why attribute an opinion
(especially a majority opinion) to a particular Justice at all? Why not
issue opinions just as they are now, including a majority opinion,
concurrences, and dissents—just without the names? The majority
opinion could be labeled the opinion of “the Court,” and
concurrences and dissents could, for example, be labeled as “First
Concurrence (with three Justices joining),” “Second Concurrence
(with one Justice joining),” “First Dissent (with two Justices joining,
except as to Part II.A),” and so forth. At least one author (himself a
judge) has suggested that the practice of “issuing signed opinions is
obsolete and counterproductive,” and that “[i]t should be
abolished.”150 The argument is that decisions representing the opinion

144. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
145. Id. at 302 n.5 (“But nowhere is there the slightest indication that his general principle
was limited to that example. Even JUSTICE BREYER’s academic supporters do not make that
claim.”).
146. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 133, at 1673.
147. Id. at 1697.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 1699 (“[T]he exposure of internal divisions in the Court may encourage
political actors to respond politically by trying to reshape or pack the Court rather than
persuade its members.”).
150. Nygaard, supra note 72, at 41.
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of the court as a whole but attributed to one author are subject to “an
151
unfortunate blending of judicial ego into the institutional mixture.”
Judge Nygaard of the Third Circuit argues that individually signed
opinions lead to a “deterioration in the institutional diligence . . .
leaving the judge who is assigned the opinion to write approximately
as he or she pleases as long as the result represents the conference
152
position.” He suggests that opinions ought to bear the imprimatur
of an enduring court, not “the mark of an individual justice limited by
mortal tenure,”153 and further contends that unsigned opinions tend to
be shorter, more to the point, and “statistically less windy” than
154
signed ones.
B. Benefits of Anonymous Opinions
Whether or not one accepts the notion that signed opinions
encourage judges to wax poetic when their names are on the line, it is
possible to envision benefits that would accrue from discontinuing the
use of individually named opinions.
First, unnamed opinions would make it more difficult for the
Justices to be adopted as spokespersons (willingly or otherwise) by
political interest groups, and, as Judge Posner wrote, give “much less
opportunity for the judges to play to the gallery, as our Justices do.”155
A diminution in the Justices’ public identities would likely increase
their ability to compromise among themselves on difficult cases.
Indeed, the Italian Constitutional Court considered reforms designed
to address this very issue: “[A] proposal was made to permit
anonymous or unsigned dissents. In this way, it was hoped, individual
judges would neither have the opportunity nor the temptation to form
public judicial identities that might inhibit their willingness to
compromise during the deliberative process.”156
Professors Ferejohn and Pasquino suggest the Justices have
ceased to accept “[internal] deliberative norms that urge compromise
and accommodation” among their colleagues on the Court and have

151. Id.
152. Id. at 45.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 47 (“Without the allure of ‘NYGAARD, Circuit Judge’ at the beginning of an
opinion, it might well be shorter and more to the point, and have fewer bursts of rhetoric. Judge
Per Curiam is statistically less windy than its named colleagues.”).
155. Posner, supra note 15, at 81.
156. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 133, at 1696.
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chosen instead to “speak to external audiences in their own names.”
The two primary reforms they suggest are sensible. Appointing
Justices for long, nonrenewable terms instead of life appointments
would decrease the stakes of a high court nomination, and requiring a
supermajority instead of a bare majority for confirmation by the
Senate would encourage presidents to choose more moderate
nominees.158 But the additional step of removing the names from
opinions would be a more direct means to the professors’ desired end:
a diminution of the Justices’ ability to engage in public conflict by
airing individual differences in published opinions.159
Second, anonymous opinions would better protect the Justices’
“complete independence,” cited by Hamilton as “peculiarly essential
160
in a limited Constitution.” Scholars, politicians, and the public at
large will, of course, always be free to criticize the Court’s decisions
and members as they see fit, but an all-too-common attack on certain
Justices—Souter, Kennedy, and O’Connor in particular—is that their
nominations were “mistakes” by the appointing president, and that
they are somehow “traitors.”161 It would be naive to think of the Court
as altogether apolitical, but the notion that Justices are appointed
primarily to advance a political agenda, and that if they do not then
they are failures, contributes to the zero-sum game mentality of the
appointment process.162 By design, life tenure offers the Justices their
primary protection in this realm,163 but if, as Justice Jackson
164
165
admitted and Judge Posner suspects, the Justices are keenly aware

157. Id. at 1702.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1673–74.
160. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
161. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Understanding the Rehnquist Court, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 197,
199–200 (2005) (discussing the idea that Justices Kennedy and Souter were “mistakes” by
Presidents Reagan and Bush, and that these Justices fell victim to the so-called “Greenhouse
Effect,” the tendency to drift leftward to curry favor with New York Times Supreme Court
reporter Linda Greenhouse).
162. See, e.g., David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 512 (2005) (describing the potential “gridlock”
of the judicial appointment process).
163. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 160, at 465 (“The
standard of good behavior . . . . is the best expedient which can be devised in any government to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”).
164. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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166
of how the public perceives them, then the ability to write
anonymously would be a liberating and potentially moderating
influence on the Justices. Naturally they would still be bound by stare
decisis, but they would no longer be forced in the name of political
ties or the need to advance an always-consistent interpretive method
to feel painted into ideological corners. Scholars have expressed
concern that “pride of authorship” of an earlier case could keep a
Justice from making proper decisions in subsequent cases.167 If
opinions were anonymous, however, each case would stand a greater
chance of being decided on its particular merits.
Third, from a procedural standpoint, anonymous opinions would
likely bring greater clarity to the law by decreasing the number of
separate opinions, especially what have been called “two-cents”
168
opinions representing the personal views of the author. Not only
would the number of concurrences and dissents likely decrease, but
unsigned majority opinions would also be more likely to reflect the
collective opinion of each Justice who voted with the majority, as
opposed to being primarily the work of the only Justice whose name
is on the line.
Finally, anonymous opinions would also bring a measure of
equality to the litigants by precluding the possibility that an opinion
would be read differently because of its author. In any discussion
about the Court, involving anything from questions at oral
169
argument to written opinions, reference to the name of a particular
Justice is convenient shorthand for professors and other
commentators for setting out the political underpinnings of a given
decision. Chief Justices are no doubt aware of this fact, and have been

166. See Tushnet, supra note 161, at 200 (portraying Justice Kennedy as a person who “cares
about his public persona”).
167. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78
IND. L.J. 459, 461 (2003) (“We predict that not even [Chief Justice] Rehnquist’s pride of
authorship would commit him to Dole . . . .”).
168. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 n.14 (1993) (“[I]n ‘two-cents’ concurrences, the author is
willing to join in both the outcome and rationale sponsored by the majority, but wishes to add
her own, presumably consistent, thoughts on the matter.”).
169. As further anecdotal evidence of the “cult of the judge” superseding the Court as an
institution, beginning in 2004 the Court Reporter began referring to the Justices by name in oral
argument transcripts. Previously, the word “Question” had been used regardless of the speaker.
Jay D. Wexler, Laugh Track, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 59, 59 (2005).
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known to assign opinion-writing duties accordingly. As Professor
David O’Brien observes:
A number of . . . cases illustrate that public relations may enter into
a chief justice’s calculations. The leading civil libertarian on the
Court, Hugo Black, wrote the opinion in Korematsu v. United States
(1944) . . . . A former attorney general experienced in law
enforcement, Tom Clark, wrote the opinion in the landmark
exclusionary rule case, Mapp v. Ohio (1961) . . . . And a former
counsel for the Mayo Clinic, experienced in the law of medicine,
Harry Blackmun, was assigned the abortion case Roe v. Wade
170
(1973).

It seems a laudable practice to take advantage of the Justices’
individual expertise when certain cases arise, but a troubling corollary
to this practice is that an opinion might be taken less seriously if not
authored by one of the more highly regarded members of the Court,
or more cynically if the writing Justice is perceived as having voted
the party line. Judge Nygaard further describes the problem:
There is . . . a temptation to give extra credit to or patronize the
judge who authored the opinion; that is, to say “Judge X held in the
Blank case” or “Judge X’s opinion in the Blank case.” Neither is
legitimate. I believe that the use of per curiam opinions . . . would
preempt the “new lords, new laws” approach to case analysis, make
each opinion currency of equal value, and curb the temptation to
remap old territory merely because new mapmakers, using the same
171
old methods, have come along.

As suggested in Part II, to a large extent the Court already
acknowledges the limitations of the individually signed opinion when
it uses per curiam opinions in politically charged, high profile cases
172
like Bush v. Gore. Although Justice Thurgood Marshall may have
been correct that “per curiam” is not the proper term for opinions of
a divided Court,173 anonymous opinions would enhance the Court’s
independence, institutional authority, and ability to adjudicate a
breadth of legal controversies more consistently.

170. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
267 (7th ed. 2005).
171. Nygaard, supra note 72, at 45–46.
172. See supra notes 89–105 and accompanying text.
173. Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 409 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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C. Counterarguments and Responses
Discontinuing the practice of using individually signed opinions
is, of course, vulnerable to several counterarguments. Most obviously,
the exclusive use of anonymous opinions would carry a cost in public
accountability and control of the judiciary. Anonymous opinions
would admittedly darken the veil of secrecy around the Court, but the
decreased accountability argument is itself vulnerable on several
grounds. First, when very few members of the general public know
who the Justices are,174 and fewer still actually read their opinions,175
any ostensible evaluation of the Justices becomes a “form of
worship,”176 or, conversely, vilification. Public opinion based not on
what the Justices write, but rather on sound bites reverberating
through the echo chambers of the media and the Internet, is a poor
mechanism for accountability, in any event.
Second, the “professional normative management”177 method of
judicial control and accountability employed by European systems is
also at work in the United States, making the signed opinion a helpful
but unnecessary control measure. Consider, for example, the
confirmation of Chief Justice Roberts, who was criticized as a “stealth
ideologue” for his lack of a written record as a judge.178 He was
nonetheless confirmed not because of what he had written during his
two year stint as an appellate court judge, but largely because of his
unassailable academic and professional qualifications.
Third, the use of anonymous opinions would encourage greater
internal accountability by placing responsibility for an opinion’s
content on the collective doorstep of the Court instead of the Justice
179
who happened to write for the majority. Even if individual Justices
were relieved of public scrutiny of their signed work, they would still
have to answer to their colleagues on the bench.

174. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
175. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1463 (1995) (“[I]t
can hardly be irrelevant that ordinary people simply do not read judicial opinions.”).
176. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 86.
177. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic et al., Nominee’s Views Aren’t Clear in Work Representing
Others, USATODAY.COM, July 20, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-07-20roberts-record_x.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (“For the past two years, Roberts has been a
judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., but he has handed down few rulings
on hot-button issues.”).
179. See Nygaard, supra note 72, at 49 (“Judges would read opinions with greater care . . .
because opinions could no longer be explained as that of ‘SO-AND-SO, Circuit Judge.’”).
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The suggestion that anonymous opinions would bring increased
unanimity by de-incentivizing separate opinions (predicated on the
notion that they will only take the time to set forth an opinion when
their name is in lights) could be perceived as insulting to judges. It is
not intended to be. If anything, the feasibility of the argument for
anonymous opinions rests squarely on a high degree of trust in judges
based on their intellect, professionalism, and integrity, regardless of
their ideological alignment.
CONCLUSION
By tracing the historical development of the Court’s use of the
individually signed opinion, this Note seeks to emphasize several
points. First, nothing in the U.S. Constitution or any other source of
American law requires judicial opinions to be attributed to an
individual, and that the evolution of the practice was as much the
product of personalities as of common law tradition or an express
desire for accountability. Second, periodic departures from the
practice (by use of per curiams or other alternative opinion delivery
devices) demonstrate the Justices’ awareness that anonymity can
enhance institutional credibility. And third, certain foreign legal
systems (Continental European ones in particular) can and do
operate without individually signed opinions with no great cost in
judicial accountability, based on institutional controls that are, to a
large extent, also present in the United States.
To be clear, this Note does not advocate a return to the John
Marshall facade of unanimity at all costs, and its author agrees with
Judge Nygaard’s “not-so-tentative hypothesis” that the practice of
issuing individually signed opinions is not going to change any time
180
soon. Still, it posits that anonymity would help preserve the Court’s
image as a neutral and unbiased arbiter, and might have the welcome
side effect of increasing unanimity without any real cost in
accountability.
There may, however, be another cost associated with anonymity:
a decline in public interest in the Court. Given that over 60 percent of
Americans cannot identify a single Justice, if the occasional salacious
post to a blog about a judge’s personal life piques the public’s
attention, then perhaps, in the name of civic republicanism, it is worth
the tradeoff in the Court’s institutional legitimacy. But if, by virtue of
180.

Id. at 41.
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anonymity, opinions became shorter, more accessible, less fractured,
and less susceptible to the perception that the Justices are no less
divided than Congress and the country in general, then a de-emphasis
on its individual parts might enhance the credibility and stature of the
Court as a whole.

